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CORPORATIONS-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-
- 'DOING BUSINESS IN THE
STATE".-BROOKFORD MILLS INc. V. BALDWIN sr AL., 139 N. Y. Sun'., 195.-
Held, that a foreign corporation, which sends its product into another
State for sale through a commission merchant, who transacts the business,
makes the sales, and receives the consideration, is not "doing business" in
-the State.
The words "doing business" under most State statutes should be con-
strued to mean the doing of any substantial part of the business for which
the corporation was organized. People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 105
N. Y., 76. The maintenance of an office by a foreign corporation and the
-carrying on of any of its usual business within a State, is generally held
to be "doing business"; and by weight of authority, the carrying on of any
of its ordinary business alone is enough. Ginn v. N. E. Mfg. Co., 92 Ala.,
135;Lamb v. Lamb, Fed. Cas., 8018; International Text Book Co. v. Con-
nelly, 124 N. Y. Supp., 257. Continuance of business is generally neces-
sary; a single act not being enough to bring it within the meaning of the
statute. National Carbon Co. v. Bredel Co., 193 Fed., 897; Del. & Hudson
Canal Co. v. Mahlenbrock, 63 N. J. Eq., 281; Penn. Collieries Co. v.
McKeever, 183 N. Y., 76; Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S., 727.
'Some cases hold that the doing of a single act, if within the usual-course
of ordinary business for whicli the corporation was organized, is "doing
business". Mdler Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank of Dotham, 57 Sou.,
762; Lamb v. Lamb, supra. A foreign corporation is not "doing business"
-if it sells and delivers goods through drummers and common carriers.
Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. McLean, 149 Ill. App., "360; Droege &
.Ahrens v. Ott Mfg. Co., 163 N. Y., 466; Wolf-Dwyer Co. v. Bigler, 192
Pa. St., 466; Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co., 205 U. S.,
530. Nor is it "doing business" when it consigns goods to factors or mer-
-chants to sell on commission. Havens & Geddes Co. v. Diamond, 93 Ill.
App., 557; Crocker v. Muller, 83 N. Y. Supp., 189; Wolf -Dwyer Co. v.
Bigler, supra. But it is "doing business" if it maintains an.agent who
'has the power to make binding contracts. Irons v. S. L. & G. H. Rodgers,
166 Fed., 781 The general rule in interpreting State statutes which im-
pose conditions on the doing of business by foreign corporations would
seem from the above to demand that the business be permanent in char-
acter, continuous in its nature, general in its scope, and carried on directly
by the corporation itself, before it will be deemed to be "doing business".
CRIMINAL LAW-ACCEssoRY BEFORE THE FAcT-AcTS CONSTITUTING.-
PEOPLE V. POLLAK, 139 N. Y., SuPP., 831.-Held, that one inciting boys
under sixteen years of age to a vicious course of general condfict, and
holding himself out to them as willing to purchase any silk which they
may procure in any manner, is not a principal in a specific larceny by the
YALE LAW JOURNAL
boys of silk, so as to destroy the character of his act as a receiver of
stolen goods.
The New York Penal Code, Sec. 29, abolishes the common law distinc-
tidin between a principal and an accessory before the fact, and makes the
accessory a principal in the crime. The question, therefore, was whether
the conduct of the defendant was such as to make him an accessory before
the fact at common law. An accessory before the fact is one who, being
absent at the time the crime is committed, yet procures, counsels, or com-
mands another to commit it. 1 Hale Pleas of the Crown, 615; Trial of
Aaron Burr, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch), 470; U. S. v. Hartwell, 26 Fed. Cas., 196.
And one is responsible for the wrong which directly flows from his cor-
rupt intentions. Spies v. People, 122 Ill., 1. If he gives directions vaguely
and incautiously, and the person receiving them acts according to what he
might have foreseen would be the understanding, he is responsible. Spies
v. People, supra. It is not necessary that the acts or words of the acces-
sory should directly incite or expressly command the principal to commit
the crime; it is enough if it appears that they were intended to secure
the crime, and that they effected that result. Sage v. State, 127 Ind., 15.
Under these last rulings it would seem as if the conduct of the defendant
in the principal case might be construed so as to convict him of being an
a cessory to the larceny. The case of Vincent v. State, 9 Tex. App., 46, is
similar, but brings out a distinction which undoubtedly affected the ruling
in the principal case. In the Texas case the defendant encouraged two
boys to procure certain hogs, promising to pay a stated price for them.
Subsequently the boys, without the defendant's presence or cobperation,
stole the hogs designated by him, and delivered them to him. The defend-
ant was held to be an accessory before the fact. Here the specific property
was designated; in the principal case, no specific property was pointed
out. This distinction is more apparent than real. The conduct of the
defendant in each case is equally perversive of the welfare of society, and:
incites and produces criminal acts in each instance. It would seem as if
public policy should require the punishment of the defendant in each case.
CRIMINAL LAW-REASONABLE DOUBT.-AYER v. TERRITORY OF NEW
MLxIco, 201 FED., 498.Held, that a charge that "a reasonable doubt is one-
for which a reason could be given based on the evidence or want of evi-
dence in the case" destroys the rule of reasonable doubt, substitutes for a
reasonable doubt a demonstrable doubt, logically and conclusively sus-
tained by the evidence or the want of it, and places too heavy a burden
upon the defendant.
The definition of a reasonable doubt as one for which a reason could
be given based on the evidence or want of evidence in the case, has been
laid down in several States, Hodge v. State, 97 Ala., 37; Vann v. State, 83
Ga., 44; State v. Jefferson, 43 La. Ann., 995; upon the ground that it guards
against capriciousness, conjecture, indulgence of speculation upon possibili-
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ties and the invasion of the realm of the imagination. In Rhodes v. State,
128 Ind., 189, it is stated that it is very doubtful if such a charge is correct.
In People v. Stubenvoil, 62 Mich., 329, such a charge was held to be inaccu-
rate, but not of sufficient consequence in a trial for manslaughter to be
error. Many decisions, however, hold such a charge to be fatal error.
Childs v. State, 34 Neb., 236; State v. Morey, 25 Ore., 242; State v. Sauer,
133 Ind., 677; Abbott v. Oklahoma, 94 Pac., 179. These decisions are
based upon the grounds that a juror may feel a reasonable doubt which he
may be unable to give a reason for in words, and that such a charge would
in effect shift the burden of proof upon the defendant, requiring him to
prove his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The holding in the prin-
cipal case, in accord with the last cases cited, seems to lay down the better
rule, for the reason given, that too heavy a burden would be placed upon
the defendant if such a charge were allowed. The most widely approved
definition of a reasonable doubt is that laid down by Chief-Justice Shaw in
Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295, that a reasonable doubt
is such a doubt as would cause a prudent and rational man to act or, to
pause or hesitate to act in the determination of any of the affairs of life
of the highest importance to himself.
DABIAGEs-BREACI. OF TiE MARRIAGE PROA1ISE--- AGGRAVATION-SE-
DUCTION.-DALRYMPLE v. GREEN, (KAN.), 129 PAC., 1145.-Defendant
promised to marry the plaintiff and, by means of this promise, induced
her to permit sexual intercourse. This was followed by other acts
of such intercourse from which pregnancy, miscarriage, and sickness re-
sulted. This is an action for damages for the breach of the promise to
marry. Held, that in assessing damages, the jury might take into con-
sideration the first act of intercourse, but not those subsequent acts from
which pregnancy, miscarriage and sickness resulted, as such could not be
the proximate result of the promise of marriage, nor the breach of it.
Mason, Burch, and Benson, JJ., dissenting.
At common law a woman had no right of action solely on the ground
,of seduction. Hamilton v. Lomax, 26 Barb., 615; Cli'ze v. Templeton, 78
Ky., 550; Conlon v. Cassidy, 17 R. I., 518. But in a few American States
this right has been conferred by statute. Marshall v. Taylor, 98 Cal., 55;
Watson v. Watson, 49 Mich., 540; Hood v. Sudderth, 111 N. C., 215; Re-
'dised Code of Iowa, 1907, Sec. 3470. In most States evidence that the
woman was seduced under a promise of marriage is admissible in aggrava-
tion of damages in an action for the breach of promise to marry. Sramek
v. Sklenar, 73 Kan., 450; Hattin v. Chapman, 46 Conn., 607; Paul v.
Frazier, 3 Mass., 71; Wells v. Padgett, 8 Barb., 323; Osmun v. Winters,
25 Ore., 260. In Tennessee, it was- held that in such an action evidence" of
an unsuccessful attempt to seduce may be shown in aggravation of dam-
-ages. Kaufman v. Fye, 99 Tenn., 145. This evidence, however, is ad-
-missible only where the seduction follows the promise and is effected by
-means of it. Espy v. 'Jones; 37 Ala., 379. In a great number of States it
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is held that the seduction must be alleged in the complaint to be admissible
in evidence. Leavitt v. Cutler, 37 Wis., 46; Cates v. McKinney, 48 Ind., 562;
Tyler v. Salley, 82 Me., 128; Dent v. Pickens, 34 W. Va., 240. A very
small minority 6f States will not admit evidence of seduction in an action
for breach of promise. Baldy v. Stratton, 11 Pa. St., 316; Wrynn v.
Downey, 27 R. I., 454. In a few cases evidence that seduction was fol-
lowed by pregnancy was held inadmissible. Tyler v. Salley, supra; Giese v.
Schultz, 65 Wis., 487. The opposite view, however, prevails in a far
greater number of jurisdictions. Tubbs v. Van Kleek, 12 Ill., 446; Wilds v.
Bogan, 57 Ind., 453; Mitsselinan v. Barker, 26 Neb., 737; Hotchkins v.
Hodge, 38 Barb., 117; Johnson v. Levy, 122 La., 118. In Musselnan v.
Barker, supra, the Court places emphasis on the fact that the child was
begotten while the agreement for marriage existed and on the faith thereof
on the part of the plaintiff. The same facts were emphasized in Johnson
v. Jarvis, 2 Ohio Dec., 312. In Illinois,-it was held that in an action for
breach of promise evidence of a venereal disease contracted from the de-
fendant was incompetent in aggravation of damages because too remote,
although evidence of pregnancy resulting from intercourse had with the
defendant in faith of his promise is competent. Churan v. Sebesta, 131 11.
App., 330. In civil actions for seduction, the defendant's acts of sexual
intercourse are regarded as being one transaction, and evidence of contin-
uous acts, including subsequent conception and the birth of a child, may
be shown as bearing on the question of damage. Breiner v. Nugent, 136
Iowa, 322; Thompson v. Glendenilig, 1 Head (Tenn.), 287; Davis v.
Young, 90 Tenn., 303. The most favorable criticism that can be made of
the decision in the principal case is that it is extremely technical. It is
contrary to reason and human observation to concede that a promise of
marriage may induce one act of sexual intercourse and then to hold that
it will so far cease to operate as not to make it the prime inducement of
subsequent acts and their natural results.
HABEAS CORPUS-APPEAL-DENIAL OF WRIT.-EX PARTE COPLEY, 153
S. W. (TEx.), 325.-Held, that no appeal can be taken from a refusal to
issue a writ of habeas corpus..
The writ of habeas corpus, though a writ of right, is not one of course,
except where it is so provided by statute. Broomhead v. Chisohm, 47 Ga.,
390; Conn. Gen. Stat. (Rev. 1902), Sec. 997. The general rule is that
probable cause for its issuance must be shown. In re Heather, 50 Mich.,
261; O'Malia v. Wentworth, 65 Me., 129. There is a conflict in the cases
dealing with the question raised in the principal case, as to whether ar
appeal can be taken from a refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The
rule that ' an appeal can be taken is laid down in Costello v. Palmer, 20
App. Cas. (D. C.), 210; Ex parte Edwards, 11 Fla., 174; Wood on Habeas
Corpus, 142. The contrary rule, that an appeal cannot be taken is held
in Gill on Petition, 92 Ky., 118; Ex parte Ainsworth, 27 Tex., 731. Before
an appeal can 'be taken in any litigated matter there must be final adjudica-
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tion of the question in the Court below. Wingo v. State, 99 Ind., 343; Long
v. Long, Morr. (Iowa), 381. In Costello v. Palmer, supra, a refusal to
issue a writ of habeas corpus was held to be final. The Kentucky and
Texas cases hold that such a refusal is not final and conclusive, since the
prisoner may apply to any or every judge in the State in turn for a writ.
A strict sense of justice would seem to require that if the writ was re-
fused by all the judges to whom application could be made, the prisoner
should be permitted to take an appeal. He should be given every oppor-
tunity to prove the illegality of his commitment, even though in such case
it is obvious that such manifest facts as would justify all the judges in
refusing to issue the writ, would inevitably prevent an Appellate Court
from reversing the ruling.
INCEST-ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE-RELATION OF PARTIEs.-HAMITO9 V.
STATk, (TEx.), 153 S. W., 331. The defendant was married in Texas to
the mother of the girl with whom incest was charged. He had been pre-
viously married in Utah and had never been divorced, but had not heard of
his first wife in eight or ten years and did not know whether she was living
or dead. Held, that defendant could not be guilty of incest because it did
not affirmatively appear that the former wife was dead or that the mar-
riage had been legally terminated.
Incest is the carnal copulation of man and woman related to each
other in any of the degrees within which marriage is prohibited by law.
State v. Herges, 55 Minn., 464. It was not indictable at common law.
State v. Keesler, 78 N. C., 469; Tuberville v.. State, 4 Tex.; 128. There.
could be no conviction for incest under the laws of Louisiana in 1878, it
being denounced but not defined. State v. Smith, 30 La. Ann., 846. But
there have since been convictions under a statute passed in 1884. State v.
Guiton, 51 La. Ann., 155. According to the weight of authority assent of
both parties is not necessary to constitute the crime of incest. David v.
People, 204 Ill., 479; State v. Freddy, 117 La., 121; Smith v. State, 108 Ala.,
1; State v. Nugent, 20 Wash., 522. But a few States hold that assent of
both parties is necessary. People v. Jenness, 5 Mich., 305; State v. Eding,
141 Mo., 281; Commonwealth v. Goodhue, 43 Mass., 193. A common
knowledge of the relationship has been held necessary to create the crime
of incest. Baumer v. State, 49 Ind., 544. But the opposite view was held in
Alabama. Morgan'v. State, 11 Ala., 289. It is not necessary to the com-
mission of the crime that the relationship of the parties be legitimate.
Baker v. State, 30 Ala., 521; People v. Lake, 110 N. Y., 61. This doctrine
has been requently applied where the daughter was illegitimate. State v.
Laurence, 95 N. C., 659; Brown v. State, 42 Fla., 184; Clark v. State, 39
Tex. Cr. R., 179. In Mississippi cohabitation by a man with his step-
daughter is not incestuous. Chancellor v. State, 47 Miss., 278. The prin-
cipal case arose under a Texas statute which made such cohabitation in-
cestuous. It was held in that State that on a trial for incest with a step-
daughter, it must be shown that the girl's mother and her stepfather were
YALE LAW JOORNAL
legally husband and wife. McGrew v. State, 13 Tex. App., 34. This was
followed in a later case where it was held that it must affirmatively appear
that the first marriage relation had been terminated by death or divorce
before the defendant could be guilty of incest with the' daughter of the
second wife, Harville v. State, 113 S. W., 283. The facts adjudicated in
the principal case are very unusual and the only cases directly in point
arose in Texas, where the decisions were in harmony with the decision' in
the principal case. Since the crime of incest could have been committed
by the defendant only in the event the female was legally his" stepdaughter,
the conclusion in the principal case is logically irresistible.
JURY-RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY-IMPAIRMENT-MISCONDUCT OF JUROR.
-PEOPLE V. ROSELLE, (CAL.), 129 P., 477. The defendant's attorney made
affidavit that he saw a juror asleep during the taking of testimony but did
not know how long he had been asleep and that before he could inform
the Court a recess was ordered. Held, that this was not sufficient ground
for a new trial, the juror's condition not being shown to be such that he
failed to hear any question or answer.
A new trial is the proper remedy for the misconduct of the jury.
Morgan v. Bell, (La.) 4 Mart. (0. S.), 615. But the misconduct of a
juror must be gross, to afford ground for a new trial. Harrison v. Price,
22 Ind., 165. It must also have probably injured the complaining party.
Flatter v. McDermitt, 25 Ind., 326. It has also been held that the mis-
conduct must be caused by the prevailing party, or some one on his be-
half. Koehler v. Cleary, 23 Minn., 325. A juror may not talk to the
plaintiff concerning the case during recess. (Ky.) Ironton" Lumber Co. v.
Wagner, 119 S. W., 197. Nor express an opinion to outsiders on the
merits of the case. Norcross v. Willard, 82 Vt., 185. A remark by a juror
after verdict, however, is held not to be ground for a new trial. Goldberg
v. Berman, 33 R. I., 448. But it was not prejudicial error for one or more
jurors to play in a card game with others in which the plaintiff and his
attorney were playing. Feary v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 162 Mo., 75;
Ayrhart v. WVilhelmy, (Iowa) 112 N. W., 782. The furnishing of intoxi-
cating liquor, during trial or deliberation on verdict, is ground for a new
trial. Bernier v. Anderson, 8 Idaho, 675. It has been held that cider, but
not intoxicating liquors, may be furnished to a jury. Tripp v. Bristol
County Cont'rs., 84 Mass., (12 Allen), 556. And the mere fact that jurors
had intoxicating liquor in their possession while deliberating was not of
itself sufficient to make a new trial necessary. Richardson v. Jones, 1 Nev.,
405.. Where the use of liquor is moderate, and no injury resulted there-
from to the losing party, it is not ground for a new trial. Gamble v. State,
44 Fla., 429; State v. Corcoran, 7 Idaho, 220. But where the juror is so
intoxicated that his faculties are affected, the verdict should be set aside.
Underwood v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., (R. I.) 76 A., 766. The sleeping
of jurors was held to be misconduct affording ground for a new trial in
Indiana. Alderman v. Cobb, 94 Ind., 602. But ii was held ih°Arkansas
RECENT CASES
that a new trial should not be granted upon affiidavit "that during the
trial, or at least a portion of it, one of the jurors was to all appearances
asleep." Pelhan v. Page, 6 Ark. (1 Eng.), 535. Nor is it ground for a
-new trial where the juror made affidavit that he had a habit of listening
with his eyes closed and that he heard what was said by witnesses and
counsel. Continental Casualty Co. v. Semple, (Ky.) 112 S. W., 1122. It
was also held that an appellant cannot complain that a juror slept during
argument of counsel, when he did not request the Court to awaken him.
Slaughter v .Coke County, 34 Tex. Civ. App., 598. Mere conjecture or
surmise that the jury acted improperly never requires the granting of a
new trial. McWhorter v. Haigler Mercantile Co., (Ala.) 58 So., 790. In
-case of misconduct of the jury the complainant must call it to the atten-
-tion of the Court immediately; he may not speculate upon the verdict.
.Shepherdson v. Clopine, 83 Neb., 764; Uhner v. Seelnan, 159 Mich., 253;
Woods v. Klein, 223 Pa., 257. The decision of the principal case is sound
in the doctrine it announces that one cannot complain of the misconduct
of the jury, unless he does so at the time it happens and shows that he has
-probably been injured thereby.
MASTER AND SERVANT-"FELLOW SERVANTS'--EMPLOYEES ON DIFFERENT
TRAINs.-CHESAPEAKE & 0. Ry. Co. v. BROWN ET AL., 153 S. W. (Ky.),
753.-Held, that a brakeman on one train was not a fellow servant of the
-operatives of another train on the same railroad, by whose negligence he
-was injured.
The rule most generally followed is that all are fellow servants who
are in the same service, and subject to the same general control, even
though in different grades and departments. Farwell v. Boston R. Co., 4
Met. (Mass.), 49; Brown v. Winona, etc., R. Co., 27 Minn., 338. Under
-this rule trainmen working on different trains for the same railway com-
-pany must be considered fellow servants. Vermillion v. Bait. & 0. R.
-Co., 38 App. D. C., 434; Mellish v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 167 Mich., 86;
Ham v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 136 Mo. App., 17. It has even been
held that train crews of one railroad company running over the track of
:another, under the complete control of an employee of the latter, are fellow
:servants of the train crews of the latter company. Johnson v. Wheeling
Terminal Ry. Co., 65 W. Va., 415. Some States, however, hold that for
-persons to be fellow servants they must work in the same grade or de-
-partment so as to afford them the power and opportunity of exercising a
-mutual influence over each other promotive of proper caution. Thompson
v. Northern Hotel Co., 99 N. E. (Ill.), 878; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Dwyer,
.36 Kan., 58; Pittsburg R. Co. v. Devinney, 17 Ohio St., 197. Under this
rule the train crews of different trains have been held not fellow servants.
.Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. House, 172 Ill., 601; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Rob-
erts, 110 Ky., 856. Motormen of different cars operated by a street rail-
way company have been held not fellow servants. Louisville Ry. Co. v.
-Haynes, 128 S. W. (Ky), 1055. But contra, Birmingham Ry., etc., Co. v.
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Moseley, 164 Ala., 111. These last cases are in accord with the modern
tendency of legislation to increase the employers' liability. It is becoming
.iniVersally .recognized that the welfare of society is best promoted by the
-most. liberal policy towards workingmen, and therefore wherever .prac-
ticable the definition of fellow servants should be restricted. In the case
of train crews on different trains, however, it would seem better to regard
them still as fellow servants. "Being engaged in the same kind of ser-
vice, they must naturally be often thrown into contact, and have ample
opportunities for mutual supervision." justice Brewer in Howard v. Den-
ver,. etc., R. Co., 26 Fed., 837. To make the employer liable and responsi-
ble for the negligence of fellow servants would unavoidably lead to care-
lessness and ngligence which would not otherwise result; and in the case
of railroad employees, who have -charge over the safety of all who ride
over the road, it is essential that they preserve the highest degree of care
and caution in their work. To hold the train crews of different trains
fellow servants would tend to prevent negligence, where it is most essentiab
that it be prevented.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-DISOBEDIENCE OF RULES
-SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO. V. SHAMOS, (GA.), 76
S. E., 1083.-A telephone company waived a rule requiring its employes.
to wear rubber gloves and rubber coats by knowingly permitting work to,
be done without them.
The general rule is that where an employe disobeys a reasonable rule
of his employer and suffers injury thereby, he cannot recover. Nordquist
-v. Great Northern Ry Co., 89 Minn., 485; St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Caraway, 77 Ark., 405; Smith v. Foster, 93 Ill. App., 138; Western Mat-
tress Co. v. Ostergaard, 71 Neb., 572. But such rules are binding only ork
employes who have knowledge of them. Little v. Southern Ry. Co., 120r
Ga.; 347; Humphreys v. Raritan Copper Works, 60 A. (N. J.), 62. It is
not necessary that the disobedience be willful or intentional; it is enough
-if there is a failure to use ordinary care. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Stevens,
80 III. App., 671. It was held in Texas that breach of a rule was not neg-
ligence per se unless the act was one so opposed to the dictates of commorb
prudence that no careful person would commit it. Galevston, H. & S. A..
Ry. Co. v. Cherry, 98 S. W., 898. Nor is a servant excused where his
disobedience is obviously dangerous, though the rule is habitually dis-
obeyed by employes. Eldorado & B. R. Co. v. Whatley, 114 S..W., (Ark.),
234. Neither can the disobedience of a rule by one servant excuse another for-
.disobeying a rule. Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Collier, 157 Fed., 347. Dis-
obedience of a master's rule is still negligence per se though a superior
servant of the master is present. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Rapp, 81.
N. E. (Ohio), 748. But it is otherwise if he acts under a foreman.
Wiley v. St. Joseph Gas Co., 132 Mo. App., 380. A servant cannot justify
disobedience on the grounds that the rule was unnecessary or that he
adopted another equally safe. Gilbourne v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co.,.
114 P. (Utah), 532. But it was held in Georgia that he could show that
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the rule was not made in good faith. Seaboard Air Line R. k. Co. v.
HuOt, 73 S. E., 588. In Ndw Jersey it was held that the employe could
recover for injuries resulting from violation of a rule where it was given
him only for his giidance and he did not know the danger ifvolved in its
violation. Horandt v. Rosenthal, 79 Ala., 321. An employe is not responsi-
ble for willful or intentional disobedience when the reason for it is sick-
ness or emergency. Junction Mining Co. v. Ecnlh, 111 Ill. App., 346; Brown
v. Southern Ry., 82 S. C., 528. Where the master with knowledge allows
a rule to'be habitually disregarded, no blame attaches to servant. Tullis v.
Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 105 Fed., 554; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Finn,
80 Fed., 483; A. G. S. R. R. Co. v. Bonner, 39 So. (Ala.), 619; Fluhrer v.
Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 121 Mich., 212. Customary violation with-
out master's knowledge is not sufficient. King v. Woodward Iron C6., 59
So. (Ala.), 264. Even though a master has waived a rule by n6t exact-
ing obedience, a servant is not excused where he has been -personally
warned not to disobey it. Crawford v. So. Ry., 150 N. C., 619. Where a
rule that employes must wear goggles in a department of a plant where
caustic soda was made was habitually disregarded by employes with mas-
ter's- knowledge, it was held- not contributory negligence to disobey it.
Haley v. Solway Process Co., 112 N. Y. S., 25. The holding of -the prin-
cipal case is in harmony with the weight of authority and is sound.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO THIRD PERSON-SON AS' AGENT OF
FATHER.-MARSHALL V. TAYrOR, .153 S. W. (Mo.), 527.-Held, that where
an automobile was provided by a father for the use of members of his
family, and an adult son was chauffeur for them, and was permitted to
hse the car for his own pleasure, the son was an agent of the father,
though using the car for his own pleasure, so as to make the father liable
for his negligence.
All the authorities are in accord in holding that a principal, or a mas-
ter, is not liable for the torts of his agent, unless they are committed
while the agent is acting for him. Bigelow on Torts, p: 55; Jones v. Hoge,
47 Wash., 663; Lotz v. Hanson, 217 Pa., 339. The cases are not in har-
mony, however, on the question whether a son, driving for his own pleas-
ure an automobile provided by his father for the use of the family, is
such an agent or servant of his father, as to render his father liable for
his negligence. The son is regarded as such an agent in Stowe v. Morris,
147 Ky., 387, and in Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App., 415, on the ground
that since the automobile was provided for the use of the family, the son
was carrying out what, within the spirit of the matter, was the business of
the father. An -early case, Lashbrook- v. Patten, 1 Duv. (Ky.), 316, held
that a son driving the horses and carriage of his father, with the father's
approbation, was the servant of his father. On the other hand, Doran
s. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L., 754, and Maher v. Benedict, 108 N. Y. Supp., 228,
hold that in such cases the son is not acting as the agent of his father.
Where the son uses the machine as a means of recreation and pleasure to
himself, it would seem impossible to draw the conclusion that he could
YALE LAW JOURNAL
be regarded as the agent or servant of his father upon that occasion.
Doran v. Tohmsen, supra. The holding in the New Jersey and New
LYork cases seems to be more in accord with the rule laid down above, that
the principal is only liable for the torts of his servant, when the servant is
:acting for him. It seems to be a strained conclusion to consider the son
in this case, as acting for his father.
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES-CONVEYANCE APART FROm BUSINESS
-RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE.-IN RE JAYSEE CORSET Co., 201 FED., 779.-Held,
that conveyance of a trade-mark, unaccompanied by any business to which
it had been previously attached, conferred no title on the assignee.
The rule laid down above is in harmony with all the American and
English decisions. It is universally held that a trade-mark or name
cannot be assigned except in connection with an assignment of the par-
ticular business in which it has been used. Falk v. American West Indies
Trad. Co., 180 N. Y., 445; Viano v. Baccigalupo, 133 Mass., 160; Brown
Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S., 540; Croft v. Day, 49 Eng. Reprint, 994.
The office of a trade-mark is to point out distinctly the origin or owner-
ship of the article to which it is affixed, or in other words, to give notice
as to who was the producer. Deering Harvester Co. v. Whitman & Barnes
Mfg. Co., 91 Fed., 376, 378. As an abstract right, apart from the business
in which it is used, a trade-mark has no existence, and to permit a trade-
mark to be transferred apart from the business in which it is used would
be productive of fraud upon the public. Paul: Trade-marks, See. 116.
The public relies upon a trade-mark as designating the firm which pro-
duces the goods, and as a guarantee that the reputation and methods of
the producer are behind the goods sent out. To permit the assignment
of the trade-mark alone would be to do away with all the advantages to
be gained by the use of a trade-mark, since the public, finding that the
trade-mark could be assigned at will, and that a new firm, whose methods
might be entirely different, might be producing the goods, would soon
-distrust all trade-marks as meaningless and misleading devices.
WEAPONS-UNLAWFUL CARRYING.-CRAIN V. STATE, 153 S. W. (TEx.),
155.-Defendant loaned money for a short time and a pistol was pledged
to him, the cylinder of which he removed and put into his coat pocket and
the frame of which he put into his pantaloons pocket. Held, that this was
an unlawful carrying of a concealed weapon.
It is no defense to a charge of carrying a concealed pistol that it was
unloaded. Caldwell v. State, 106 S. W. (Tex.), 343. Where one carries
-concealed all the pieces of pistol, which may be readily put together, it is
indictable. Hutchinson v. State, 62 Ala., 3. It was held to be indictable
to carry a concealed pistol though it was so battered that it could not be
discharged by the trigger. Atwood v. State, 53 Ala., 508; Redus v. State,
.82 Ala., 53. It was similarly held where the mainspring was broken and
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it was -necessary to strike the hammer to cause a discharge. Fielding v.
State, 135 Ala., 56. But it was held in the same State that where one
carried concealed a pistol which had no mainspring or other necessary
parts of a lock, and could be fired only by the use of a match or other
such means, it was not indictable. Evins v. State, 46 Ala., 88. This doc-
trine was rejected in Mississippi, and it was held that "an object, once a
pistol, does not cease to be one by becoming temporarily inefficient."
Mitchell v. State, 55 So., 354. Where one, for the owner, concealed a
pistol while taking it to a shop to be repaired it was indictable, though it
would not explode a cartridge. State v. Tapit, 52 W. V., 473; Crawford v'.
State, 94 Ga., 772. Where a statute makes it an offense to wear a pistol
"concealed as a weapon" the offense is not committed except when the
pistol is worn with intent to use it as a weapon and the presumption that
it was to be so used is rebutted by proof that it was unloaded, or unfit for
use. Carr v. State, 34 Ark., 448. Carrying a pistol with no cylinder is
not an unlawful carrying of weapons. Cook v. State, 11 Tex. App., 19.
But where the pistol was not proved to be so broken that it could not be
fired, the fact that it was broken was held to be no defense in a prosecution
for carrying weapons. State v. Smith, 96 S. W. (Tex.), 1086. It was
held, however, in the same State, that where one's reason for haviig the
pistol was that he intended to sell it, and, where he had removed the
cylinder rod to render the pistol harmless, he could not be indicted,
although it appeared that the pistol could, in fact, be made to shoot by
placing the cylinder in position with the hands. White v. State, 66 S. W.,
773. .The holding in the principal case does not seem to be in harmony
with the spirit of the last case, but is in harmony with practically all the
cases where analagous facts have been adjudicated. When it is remem-
bered, however, that the purpose of the law against carrying concealed
weapons -is to prevent sudden shooting, it would seem that the holding in
some of these extreme cases very justly deserves criticism.
WITNESSES-PRIVILEGED COiMMUNIC.ATION-WAIVER-APPEAL-SUBsE-
QUENT TRIAL--IN RE WHITING, 85 ATL. (Ms.), 791.-An attorney in a Pro-
bate Court testified to matters which could have been excluded on the
ground that they were privileged. No objection was made. In a pro-
ceeding in the Appellate Court the same evidence was excluded on the
ground that it was privileged.-Held, that this exclusion was error, and
that a right of privilege once waived cannot be asserted on a subsequent
trial.
An attorney cannot be required to state communications made to him
by his client. Brown v. Butler, 71 Conn., 576. Such a privilege, being
personal, can be waived by the client. Sleeper v. Abbott, 60 N. H.,
162; Blair v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 89 Mo., 383. But the waiver
must be distinct and unconditional. Tate v. Tate's Ex'r., 75 Va., 522.
Where a privileged communication is made jointly it cannot be waived
except -by all the parties. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 21 Grat., (Va.), 822;
Herman v. Schlesinger, 114 Wis., 382. A client waives his privilege by
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testifying himself to the privileged communications. King v. Barrett,. 11
Ohio St.,. 261. He also waives it by examining his attorney as a witness.
Stockwell v. Boyce, 53 Hun, (N. Y.), 630. Where A waiver" is expressly
made, it may be. withdrawn any time before it is acted upon. Herpol-
scheimer v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 113 N. W. (Neb.), 152. Where a waiver is
made without advice of counsel it may be withdrawn. Ross v. Great
Northern.Ry. Co., 101 Minn., 122. Hence, where the client has consented
'tbat one of his attorneys may testify, an objection to the admission of the
evi ence by his other attorney withdraws .the consent. Natlee Draft Horse
Co. v. Marion Cripe & Co., 142 Ky., 810. An objection to testimony on
the ground that it was privileged cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. Groves v. Groves, 55 Hun, 612. Where a patient allowed his
physician to testify it -was held that he waived his privilege and could not
recall it upon new trial or appeal. Marquard v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.,
126 App. Div. (N. Y.), 272; Pittsburg C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. O'Conner,
85 N. E. (Ind.), 969; Elliott v. Kansas City, 198 Mo., 593. The same de-
cision is reached where the plaintiff waives the privilege in an action in
which he is non-suited and begins a new action on the same ground
S~hlotterer v. Brooklyn & N.. Y. Ferry Co., 85 N. Y. S., 847. In Massa-
chusetts where a privilege was waived in a Probate Court it was held that
it could not be exercised upon a trial on appeal. Green v. Crapo, 181
Mass., 55. In Iowa, however, where the privilege was waived and a
physician was allowed to testify, it was held that the evidence might be
objected to on a-subsequent trial on the ground of privilege. Burgess v.
Sims Drug Co., 114 Iowa, 275. In Michigan, it was held that though the
party .has waived the privilege upon one trial, he may claim it upon a new
trial of the same cause. Breisenmeister v. Supremne Lodge, K. P. of the
World, 81 Mich., 525. The holding in the principal case is in harmony
with the majority of cases where the point has been decided and represents
the sounder view.
